Law, Science, and the Economy: One Domain? by Caudill, David S.
UC Irvine Law Review
Volume 5




Law, Science, and the Economy: One Domain?
David S. Caudill
Villanova University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr
Part of the Law and Economics Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Science and
Technology Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UCI Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in UC Irvine Law Review by
an authorized editor of UCI Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
David S. Caudill, Law, Science, and the Economy: One Domain?, 5 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 393 (2015).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr/vol5/iss2/9
Caudill_production read v3 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 6/28/2015 9:25 PM 
 
393 
Law, Science, and the Economy:  
One Domain? 
David S. Caudill* 
In an effort to explore the theoretical and practical promise of ignoring 
or erasing conventional boundaries and distinctions—such as law/society or 
inside/outside—in accounts of legal processes and institutions, I consider 
the problem of financial bias in scientific expertise. I first draw an analogy 
with science studies, and particularly Latour’s notion of science as a 
coproduction, which challenges the boundaries (i) between science and society, 
and (ii) between natural and social influences on the production of scientific 
knowledge. I then acknowledge the efforts of Philip Mirowski, in his concern 
that privatization trends degrade science, to overcome an individualistic 
perspective on financial bias (conflicts of interest, fraud) and to identify 
indirect, systemic effects of the economy on science. However, as illustrated 
by Michel Callon’s network model of the economics of science, Mirowski 
retains a set of conventional distinctions, boundaries, and assumptions 
(including the primacy of science over technology, and the primacy of academic 
science over commercialized science) that render his critique ineffective—
Mirowski’s examples of systemic effects tend to be individualistic. A more 
accurate description of the interactions between private firms and public 
laboratories, including the identification of boundary organizations and 
hybrid firm/laboratories, advances the effort to recognize and evaluate the 
systemic and not merely individualistic effects of the economy on science. I 
conclude that because scientific expertise is a coproduction of law, science, 
and the economy, and because each of the three enterprises is equally 
rhetorical, social, institutional, political, and historical, there is no priority 
or privilege of one domain over another—they are, in those senses, one. 
  
 
* Professor and Arthur M. Goldberg Family Chair in Law, Villanova University School of Law. The 
author would like to thank the participants in the “Law As . . .” III symposium, and especially Professor 
Justin Desautels-Stein, for their critical responses to this Article. 
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[W]e need to get rid of all categories like those of power, knowledge, profit or capital, 
because they divide up a cloth that we want seamless in order to study it as we choose.1 
 
Central to this symposium is the question of whether it might be practically 
and theoretically promising to ignore or erase some of our conventional legal 
categories.2 For example, instead of promoting “law and” projects that conceive of 
interactions between law and another distinct domain, why not view law as politics 
or literature (as many already have), or as economics or science (seemingly more 
challenging)? Such alternative projects question the distinctions between law and 
society (as independent domains that influence one another), and between what is 
inside and what is outside of legal processes and institutions, as a first step toward 
the effort to provide more compelling accounts of how law functions.3 
My own focus in this Article concerns the acquisition of scientific expertise 
into law, which phraseology already suggests two domains: one providing and the 
other accommodating. Narrowing my ultimate argument, I consider the 
conventional representations of the problem of financial bias in the science acquired 
by law (whether in litigation, administrative, or legislative contexts). Now there are 
three domains—science providing, law making accommodations, and the economy 
interfering. And the three-domain discourse is often one of intentionality, of good 
and bad agents, which discourse hides systemic effects that become visible only 
when one notices that the economy is already in science (whether invited or not), 
that science is already in law (by law’s adoption of science’s self-image even as law 
purports to be an evidentiary gatekeeper), and that law is already in the economy 
 
1. BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION 223 (1987). 
2. See generally Christopher Tomlins & John Comaroff, “Law As . . .”: Theory and Practice in Legal 
History, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1039, 1041 (2011). 
3. Indeed, Bruno Latour, on whose actor-network theory I rely on in this Article (with respect 
to science and society), has in LA FABRIQUE DU DROIT: UNE ETHNOGRAPHIE DU CONSEIL D’ÉTAT 
(2002), translated by Marina Brilman & Alain Pottage as THE MAKING OF LAW: AN ETHNOGRAPHY 
OF THE CONSEIL D’ETAT (Polity Press 2010) (2002), challenged such inside/outside distinctions. In the 
words of one reviewer: “Gone is a purified ‘Law’ and ‘Society’ for Latour. Dividing texts and rules (‘law 
on the books’) from people (‘law in action’) loses ground underneath the weight of La fabrique du droit. . . . 
For Latour, the force of law is produced through its everyday halting, stammering, hesitating, 
continually negotiated and overtly hybrid, practices.” Ron Levi, Book Review, 1 LAW, CULTURE & 
HUMAN. 137, 137 (2005) (reviewing BRUNO LATOUR, LA FABRIQUE DU DROIT: UNE ETHNOGRAPHIE 
DU CONSEIL D’ÉTAT (2002)). Levi is, however, disappointed: “[I]f it is impossible to imagine a ‘social’ 
without law, one wonders why Latour has here privileged the professional institution, rather than 
emphasizing the pervasive role of legality, running in, through, and beyond the courthouse walls.” Id. at 
139 (citation omitted). This criticism parallels the criticism that laboratory studies ignore broader 
societal structures. See infra notes 68–71 and accompanying text. 
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(which is never a free market). Which is not to say that the economy determines 
science, that science is determinative within law, or that law constructs the economy; 
it is to say, for example, that scientific expertise is a coproduction—a hybrid of law, 
science, and the economy—and that no single “domain” is privileged, as so often 
happens in “law and” scholarship.4 
I begin with science studies, the basis for my argument, and particularly 
Latour, because the history of science studies is one of breaking down the 
formulation of science and society as two domains. I then turn to the economics of 
science and emphasize the coproduction of science and the economy, by reference 
to Mirowski’s work on the pernicious effects of commercialization of science, and 
to Callon’s model of firm/laboratory interactions as an extended example of 
challenging conventional analytical categories. I conclude that effective solutions to 
the problem of financial bias in law’s (acquisition of) science require 
reconceptualizing three domains as one—while at the same time acknowledging 
that when conventional boundaries are erased, others may take their place. 
I. A STRONG ANALOGY: SCIENCE STUDIES 
When I say there is no inside/outside distinction, I mean that we should not believe in 
the existence of inside and outside. We should sit exactly at the place where the inside 
and the outside of the network are defined. . . . [W]e have to see inside-and-outside as 
an active category, created by the actors themselves, and it has to be studied as such.5 
The field of science studies is ill-defined, referring directly to a collection of 
social science subdisciplines—science and technology studies, sociology of science 
(or sociology of scientific knowledge), science and society—and indirectly to the 
history and philosophy of science. “Science studies” is decidedly not one of the 
natural sciences, which are its objects of study, and while early sociologists of 
science might have attempted to show how science at its best is unaffected by 
cultural forces, contemporary science studies reveal scientific knowledge as 
coproduced, if not constructed, by social structures, including, for example, 
language, rhetoric, values, institutions, money, guiding paradigms, and experimental 
conventions. While no one would deny the existence of the foregoing as 
constituting a context of supports for the scientific enterprise, the notion that 
scientific knowledge is determined (“social constructivism”) or at least coproduced 
is controversial among nearly all scientists and scientistic theorists, hence the 
“science wars” in the 1990s.6 
 
4. See Penelope Pether, Language, in LAW AND THE HUMANITIES: AN INTRODUCTION 315, 
318 n.7 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2010) (explaining that law is typically the “privileged element” or object 
of interdisciplinary inquiry in the law and literature dyad, insofar as the inquiry is typically concerned 
with what literature—both its texts that represent law and lawyers and its critical methodologies—can 
tell us about or do for law). 
5. Thomas Hugh Crawford, An Interview with Bruno Latour, 1 CONFIGURATIONS 247, 257 (1993) 
(statement by Bruno Latour concerning the relation of science and society). 
6. In response to a perceived attack on the natural sciences by science studies, various authors 
fought back. See PAUL R. GROSS & NORMAN LEVITT, HIGHER SUPERSTITION: THE ACADEMIC LEFT 
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Bruno Latour occupied an uncomfortable position in the science wars—he 
became the signifier of, and whipping boy for, science studies in the eyes of its 
critics, notwithstanding the riven state of science studies and its cottage industry of 
criticizing Latour. Latour’s association with science studies is clearly justified, both 
because he (with Woolgar) practically invented laboratory studies,7 and because his 
books have a substantial (though not exclusive) following among science studies 
scholars. But in the science wars, the enemies of science studies were attacking social 
constructivism as a critique or reduction of science’s accomplishments; and while 
very few science studies scholars would fit that particular caricature, Latour is 
famous for his rejection of social constructivism for its maintenance of the social/
natural distinction—for merely replacing natural explanations of scientific progress 
with social explanations.8 Having taken (or engendered) both the linguistic and the 
naturalist turn in science studies, Latour does not privilege the “social”—scientific 
facts are too discursive, and too natural, to be reduced to the “social” (which they 
are, as well).9 Latour recognizes his lack of credibility on such matters for scientistic 
critics of science studies, and imagines their response: 
“You can dust your hands with flour as much as you wish, [but] the black 
fur of the critical wolf will always betray you; your deconstructing teeth 
have been sharpened on too many of our innocent labs—I mean lambs!—
for us to believe you.”10 
To be fair, even if such critics rose above oversimplification and stereotyping 
through a more sophisticated engagement with Latour, they probably would not 
like him. Just as important, and despite his influence in science studies, Latour can 
be just as maddening to his fellow sociologists of science for his rejection of critique, 
of denouncement, as the task of social scientists: 
Many see the . . . task of the intellectual[s] . . . as a critique of the foundation. 
They need to develop a metalanguage that will unveil and denounce the 
false appearances. 
. . . . 
. . . [A]ll debunking makes people believe in the thing being debunked. The 
attitude of unveiling and denouncing the falseness of the scientific method 
 
AND ITS QUARRELS WITH SCIENCE (1994); STEVEN WEINBERG, DREAMS OF A FINAL THEORY 
(1992); LEWIS WOLPERT, THE UNNATURAL NATURE OF SCIENCE (1992); Alan D. Sokal, A Physicist 
Experiments with Cultural Studies, LINGUA FRANCA, May/June 1996, at 62, 62. 
7. See generally BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS (Princeton Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) (1979) (an early study of 
a laboratory that was highly influential among later science studies scholars engaged in ethnographic 
research). 
8. See LATOUR, supra note 1, at 132–34. 
9. BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN 6 (Catherine Porter trans., Harvester 
Wheatsheaf 1993) (1991). 
10. Bruno Latour, Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern, 
CRITICAL INQUIRY, Winter 2004, at 225, 232. 
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always reinforces the argument of the scientist . . . . [Because it] makes you 
believe it is important to find the true method.11 
One way to understand Latour’s concern, and the criticism of Latour (for not taking 
sides), is to see Latour breaking down conventional categories and distinctions. The 
flaw in social constructivism was to preserve the nature/society dualism and to 
privilege the social; the flaw in modernism was to divide natural science from social 
science, nonhuman from human; the flaw in postmodernism was to believe in the 
modern as the object of denunciation. “So then the question is can we play another 
game? Can we redefine the task of the intellectual so that it is no longer denouncing 
from one of two poles?”12 To the extent that the science wars represented the 
realism/constructivism debate, Latour promises that “you do not need to believe 
in . . . either of these two poles.”13 
Things become active, and the collective becomes made of things —
circulating things . . . . [And] these hybrids (quasi-objects) start resembling 
what our world is made of. It is not that there are a few hybrids; it is that 
there are only hybrids. And the . . . purely social relation . . . and the purely 
natural construction . . . don’t exist.14 
Careful divisions “between what is natural and what is social” do not interest 
Latour.15 
Another distinction in science studies worth mentioning in this context is 
“upstream” and “downstream” contexts in the production of scientific knowledge. 
The term “ELSI”—ethical-legal-social-implications—became popular in science 
studies to designate a role for the social scientist in the production of scientific 
knowledge. Instead of waiting “downstream” for the results of science, and then 
considering the implications for society, the suggestion was made to move 
“upstream,” into the laboratory, with a team of ethicists and lawyers and 
sociologists.16 However, that conception risks eclipsing the already present ethical, 
legal, and social aspects of laboratory life, and unwittingly grants social 
independence to the scientific enterprise.17 
With respect to the role of economics and the economy in the scientific 
enterprise, Latour and Woolgar’s Laboratory Life highlighted the issue in their 
 
11. Crawford, supra note 5, at 250, 255. For example, Latour finds that Feyerabend’s 
“denouncing presupposes the existence and importance of what is at stake.” See id. at 255. See also 
Andrew Barry & Don Slater, Technology, Politics, and the Market: An Interview with Michel Callon, 31 ECON. 
& SOC’Y 285, 303 (2002) (quoting Michel Callon: “Bourdieu has not only to reinforce the [economic] 
macro-structures that are supposed to exist, but he has also to explain why the truth is on one side and 
not the other.”). 
12. Crawford, supra note 5, at 258. 
13. Id. at 261. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 262. 
16. See, e.g., Paul Rabinow, Prosperity, Amelioration, Flourishing: From a Logic of Practical Judgment to 
Reconstruction, 21 LAW & LITERATURE 301, 304 (2009). 
17. See David S. Caudill, Synthetic Science: A Response to Rabinow, 21 LAW & LITERATURE 431, 
432 (2009). 
Caudill_production read v3 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 6/28/2015  9:25 PM 
398 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:393 
Chapter 5, entitled “Cycles of Credit.”18 As D. Wade Hands points out, “Cycles of 
Credit” was not an exercise in “the economics of science” in many of the senses of 
that term.19 First, the chapter was neither an attempt to “apply” economics to 
science, nor to model science as a “competitive market process” (Wade suspects 
that Latour and Woolgar would “consider neoclassical economics to be naively 
reductionist, narrowly individualist[ic], and in general a quite uninteresting approach 
to studying (any) social process”20). The term “economics of science” more often 
refers to works “in the language and discursive format of contemporary 
economics,” such as Diamond’s theory of the rational scientist maximizing a utility 
function under constraints, or Wible’s explanation of fraud in science by specifying 
first-order conditions and optimization uncertainty.21 Second, Latour and Woolgar 
describe a quasi-economic “market for credibility that determines what scientists 
work on,” using economic analogies to describe science and scientists in capitalist 
terms (e.g., supply, demand, and value of information).22 Finally, Latour and 
Woolgar do not address the issue of the effects of the economy on science, except 
to say (in passing) that the “link between the scientific production of facts and 
modern capitalist economics is probably much deeper than a mere relation,” and 
that “[s]cientists’ final realisation of capital, through their movement into clinical 
studies, industry, and culture, is not examined” in Laboratory Life.23 
That examination has been carried out by Philip Mirowski, an economist, 
science studies fellow traveler, and critic of Latour (and of actor-network theory, 
especially its apparent economic theorist, Michel Callon).24 Mirowski’s critique of 
neoliberalism and its privatized science regimes goes a long way toward revealing, 
and shifting attention toward, the systemic effects of the economy on science; and 
he offers examples of the economic effects on science in law.25 In the end, however, 
he relies upon and reifies categories and distinctions that render his critique of 
commercialization in science ineffective.26 
 
18. LATOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 7, at 187–233. 
19. D. Wade Hands, The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge: Some Thoughts on the Possibilities, in NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY (Roger Backhouse ed., 1994), reprinted in SCIENCE 
BOUGHT AND SOLD 515, 523–24 (Philip Mirowski & Esther-Mirjam Sent eds., 2002). 
20. Id. at 526–27. 
21. See id. at 535–36 (referring to Arthur M. Diamond, Jr., Science As a Rational Enterprise, 24 
THEORY & DECISION 147 (1988); James R. Wible, Fraud in Science: An Economic Approach, 22 PHIL. SOC. 
SCI. 5 (1992); James R. Wible, Maximization, Replication, and the Economic Rationality of Positive Economic 
Science, 3 REV. POL. ECON. 164 (1991)). 
22. See Hands, supra note 19, at 525. 
23. LATOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 7, at 231 n.9, 233 n.22. Michel Callon chooses to “get rid 
of notions like market[s] of ideas, scientific capital, credibility cycles, etc., which erase the differences 
between activities that are obviously different.” Michel Callon, From Science As an Economic Activity to 
Socioeconomics of Scientific Research, in SCIENCE BOUGHT AND SOLD, supra note 19, at 277, 281 n.4. 
24. See Philip Mirowski & Esther-Mirjam Sent, Introduction, in SCIENCE BOUGHT AND SOLD, 
supra note 19, at 38–39. 
25. See id. at 54–55. 
26. See id. at 55–59. 
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II. SCIENCE AND THE ECONOMY 
[O]ne of the most repeated complaints about Latourian actor-network analysis is that 
it leaves everything pretty much just the way it found it . . . .27 
[ I]nstead of arguing [for] and reinforcing the strict opposition between open science . . . 
and a market with clearly defined boundaries . . . , [network theory] aims to show the 
possibility of scientific research that is both autonomous and strongly connected [with] 
firms.28 
The growing privatization of science raises questions about whether science is 
degraded or enhanced by relationships with (or financial support from) commercial 
industry. Does increased collaboration between scientists and industry decrease the 
collaborative behavior of scientists (i.e., freely sharing knowledge) toward one 
another? Everyone knows science costs money—it always has—but then the debate 
begins, with three identifiable positions on financial interests or entanglements: (i) 
they are relatively benign because the internal workings of scientific methodology 
are unaffected by external support (except in the case of fraud, the occasional bad 
apple); (ii) they are seriously influential and generally good for science by fostering 
efficiency and innovation; (iii) they are seriously influential with pernicious effects 
that degrade the quality of science. The first position is represented by physicist 
David Goodstein, who has written extensively on scientific fraud and was called 
upon by the federal judiciary, after the U.S. Supreme Court’s Daubert decision,29 to 
explain how science works.30 The second position is found in Paula Stephan’s How 
Economics Shapes Science, which raises no cause for alarm—there’s always room for 
improvement, of course, but “[s]cience costs money and incentives play a key role 
in science.”31 The third position has been taken up by Philip Mirowski, who fiercely 
claims to be neither naive nor Pollyannaish about any purported golden age of 
disinterested science,32 and also insists that the commercialization of science is not 
in itself a marker of decline—“accusations of corruption must be judged on a case-
by-case basis.”33 Taken as a whole, however, Mirowski suspects that 
commercialization has changed the structure of science for the worse, even as he 
concedes the difficulty of measuring that decline.34 
To be clear, Mirowski is trying not to talk about individual responsibility, 
 
27. Id. at 58. 
28. Callon, supra note 23, at 277, 281. 
29. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (confirming the active, gate-
keeping role of judges in evaluating scientific reliability). 
30. David Goodstein, How Science Works, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
67, 68 (2d ed. 2000); see also DAVID GOODSTEIN, ON FACT AND FRAUD: CAUTIONARY TALES FROM 
THE FRONT LINES OF SCIENCE (2010). 
31. PAULA STEPHAN, HOW ECONOMICS SHAPES SCIENCE 1 (2012). 
32. See Philip Mirowski & Robert Van Horn, The Contract Research Organization and the 
Commercialization of Scientific Research, 35 SOC. STUD. SCI. 503, 508 (2005) (raising the question of whether 
“images of the disinterested operation of science ever actually corresponded to research practices on 
the ground”). 
33. Id. 
34. See PHILIP MIROWSKI, SCIENCE-MART: PRIVATIZING AMERICAN SCIENCE 266 (2011). 
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scientific fraud, or the intentional manipulation of data by a scientist with an 
obvious conflict of interest due to funding. In the tradition of science studies, 
Mirowski views science and the economy as “mutually constituted”—for example, 
in the reengineering of “university science around more commercial pursuits,” we 
notice that “some forms of funding and organization of credit [i.e., from authorship 
to ownership of intellectual property] promote certain kinds of creative or 
innovative activity, while other forms actively discourage them.”35 This is a 
challenge to the scientistic notion that social interests are not “systematic or 
structural; [and] merely serve to focus our attention. . . . [They do not affect] how 
we do research or what it is that we find there.”36 In the view of science studies, 
however, “different social alignments can produce different scientific outcomes.”37 
While everyone acknowledges that decades of industry funding “may have had some 
minor influence on changing the means by which research is prosecuted, . . . [few 
imagine that] it transformed the ends of science [, i.e.,] whatever it is that we get at 
the end of the process.”38 
Examples of systemic analyses of science and the economy as coproductions 
include David Tyfield’s study of the “economic impacts on the directions of 
scientific thought, argument and controversy,” which conceptualizes science and 
the economy as a “process of ongoing (re)construction [wherein] each conditions 
the development of the other.”39 Like Mirowski, who attempts to trace the harms 
of commercialization upon “good” science,40 Tyfield argues that “‘[s]ocial 
influences’ on science are not . . . only relevant when science goes wrong or is 
corrupted in some way.”41 Another example of systemic analysis is Daniel Lee 
Kleinman’s study of the commercialization of academic science, which 
acknowledged the popular criticism that “commercially motivated collaborations 
between university biologists and science-based companies can skew research 
agendas, prompt inappropriate restrictions on the flow of information, and create 
conflicts of interest.”42 Kleinman, however, is more interested in the “subtle 
landscape” of academic capitalism—not the direct results of corporate influence, 
but how “corporate domination of a field of scientific investigation early in its 
development,” even absent subsequent industry funding, “can indirectly affect the 
questions that are asked and the answers that are acceptable at a later time.”43 The 
laboratory studied by Kleinman was neither restricted by industry sponsors nor 
 
35. PHILIP MIROWSKI, THE EFFORTLESS ECONOMY OF SCIENCE? 117, 132 (2004). 
36. Id. at 24. 
37. Id. at 21. 
38. Mirowski & Van Horn, supra note 32, at 531–32. 
39. 1 DAVID TYFIELD, THE ECONOMICS OF SCIENCE: A CRITICAL REALIST OVERVIEW: 
ILLUSTRATIONS AND PHILOSOPHICAL PRELIMINARIES 25–26 (2012). 
40. See MIROWSKI, supra note 34, at 160. 
41. 1 TYFIELD, supra note 39, at 18. 
42. DANIEL LEE KLEINMAN, IMPURE CULTURES: UNIVERSITY BIOLOGY AND THE WORLD 
OF COMMERCE, at x (2003). 
43. Id. at xi. 
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showed any signs of “egregious violations of academic norms”44 (e.g., secrecy, 
conflicts of interest); but “indirect, systemic effects”45 of commercial culture were 
identifiable, including “the ways scholarly writing in the field is framed, the way 
experiments are organized, the measures of success that are used[,] and the tools 
that are available. . . . [N]o direct intervention . . . by industry needed to occur for 
the influence to be felt.”46 Mirowski, notably, does not limit his analysis to the 
commercialization of university science, but identifies the parallel “creation of new 
social structures of research, . . . new forms of intellectual property, new 
communication technologies, new research protocols, new career paths, and new 
institutions of command and control.”47 As examples of the decline in science 
brought on by commercialization, Mirowski first identifies “just-in-time science,” 
or “the forced inducement of quick and dirty techniques to produce attenuated 
results on schedule, under budget, and within the parameters of contractual 
relations.”48 Second, Mirowski identifies the “sound science” (or anti-junk-science) 
movement wherein hidden organizations promote industry-friendly, or in terms of 
litigation, defense-friendly, science, by casting doubt on good science, demanding 
more research of good science, or harassing good scientists.49 Finally, Mirowski 
identifies the degradation of patent quality, a phenomenon that finds support in IP 
literature.50 
My question is whether Mirowski has identified systemic economic pressures; 
his examples do not appear to be “good science,” but rather to fall into his category 
of individual responsibility (the first and third examples) or fraud (the second 
example), thereby undermining his claim that he is not talking about the obvious 
deleterious effects of commercialization on science. I want to link that blind spot in 
Mirowski’s work to his criticism of Latourian actor-network theory, and in the 
economics of science literature, to Callon’s application of actor-network theory as 
a response to Mirowski’s distinction (crucial to Mirowski’s analysis) between open 
and privatized science. 
 
 
44. Id. at 6. 
45. Id. at 17. 
46. Id. at 4–6, 17, 88–89 (offering the example of the dominance of the chemical industry in 
agricultural pest-control research). 
47. Mirowski & Van Horn, supra note 32, at 504 (discussing the rise of contract research 
organizations). 
48. MIROWSKI, supra note 34, at 290. 
49. See id. at 297–99. 
50. See id. at 305–06; see also Rebecca Henderson et al., Universities As a Source of Commercial 
Technology: A Detailed Analysis of University Patenting, 1965–1988, 80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 119, 126 (1998) 
(describing an increase in “low-quality” patents granted to universities); Shawn P. Miller, Where’s the 
Innovation: An Analysis of the Quantity and Qualities of Anticipated and Obvious Patents, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 
1, 2 (2013) (estimating that about twenty-eight percent of new patents would be found at least partially 
invalid). 
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III. THE DEBATE OVER DISTINCTIONS 
[S]ince . . . we wish to attack scientists’ hegemony on the definition of nature, we have 
never wished to accept the essential source of their power: . . . the very distribution between 
what is natural and what is social and the fixed allocation of ontological status that goes 
with it. We have never been interested in giving a social explanation of anything, but we 
want to explain society.51 
Rejecting the “social explanation genre,” Latour and Callon seek to “obtain” 
nature and society through “network building, or collective things, or quasi-
objects.”52 Tired of being labeled conservative or reactionary for their supposed 
realism, they claim to be genuine coproductionists (and scold their science studies 
critics for being “exactly as reactionary” as their scores of realist critics): 
The perfect symmetry in the misreading of our work by “natural realists” 
and by “social realists” alike is a nice confirmation that we are in a different, 
although for them unthinkable, position.53 
It’s not either social relations (intentional human subjects) or things (brute material 
objects), but “the circulation of network-tracing tokens, statements, and skills” to 
be observed and documented.54 And it seems to be the agency of nonhumans that 
attracts the accusation of realism; for realist readers of Callon’s study of St. Brieuc 
Bay fishermen, the scallops must either be “out there [forcing] themselves on naive 
realists, or . . . in there made of social relations of humans talking about them”; but 
Callon and Latour do not attribute “out-thereness” to the various forms under 
which “scallops exist.”55 The key to the accusation, in any event, is the criticism that 
accounts of science by Callon or Latour do not differ from those of conventional 
historians of science—explaining a scientific discovery by “granting agency to 
things in themselves.”56 Callon and Latour concede the difficulty of finding an 
“unbiased vocabulary,” but “negotiation” is not “discovery,” and “actant” is not 
“actor.”57 
This (minimalistic) background is important because Mirowski has joined the 
harshest science studies critics of Latour and Callon. Steve Fuller, for example, 
blames the Parisians and their actor-network theory for the decline of science 
studies—its “aversion to normative judgments and . . . open antagonism to the 
 
51. Michel Callon & Bruno Latour, Don’t Throw the Baby Out With the Bath School! A Reply to Collins 
and Yearley, in SCIENCE AS PRACTICE AND CULTURE 343, 348 (Andrew Pickering ed., 1992). 
52. Id. 
53. See id. at 349–50. 
54. Id. at 351. 
55. See id. at 353 (referring to Michel Callon, Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication 
of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay, in POWER, ACTION, AND BELIEF: A NEW SOCIOLOGY 
OF KNOWLEDGE? 196 ( John Law ed., 1986)). 
56. Callon & Latour, supra note 51, at 354. 
57. See id. (“We should be credited with having tried to [establish a symmetrical vocabulary], 
and when no other solution was available, to have chosen a repertoire which bears no insult to 
nonhumans.”). 
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adoption of ‘critical’ perspectives.”58 By their invocation of “natural factors,” Latour 
and Callon have apparently caused science studies to jump the shark: 
Not surprisingly, scientists . . . have welcomed the Parisian turn, since it 
clearly reopens the door to traditional . . . explanations of science that 
incorporate both social and natural factors “interacting” to produce . . . an 
experimental outcome. It would seem, then, that we have reached one of 
those . . . [Molièrean] moments . . . when a move that appears radical within 
the terms of a paradigm is equivalent to the prose that everyone else 
outside the paradigm has been always speaking (albeit now with a French 
accent).59 
Fuller is suspicious because “a seemingly radical innovation that quickly acquires 
widespread currency probably serves some well-established interests that remain 
hidden” in its reception.60 After all, didn’t fascist ideology combine “an animistic 
view of nature, a hyperbolic vision of the power of technology, and [a] diminished 
sense of individual human agency,” just like actor-network theory?61 
Mirowski frames Science-Mart, his study of the negative effects of privatization 
on American science, as a story about the fictional, “intrepid academic researcher 
Viridiana Jones.”62 Early in the book, she meets a few fellow faculty members in 
the field of science studies, which sounded interesting enough for her to go to a 
conference at her university to hear famous representatives like Bruno Latour and 
Steve Woolgar.63 But she “was distressed to find that when they weren’t indulging 
in opaque jargon about ‘actants,’” they “tended to confuse ‘excellence’ (whatever 
that was) with the crudest sorts of proxy measures for scientific output.”64 Mirowski 
drops an endnote here to Latour’s Reassembling the Social and Latour and Woolgar’s 
Laboratory Life, among others.65 Fast forward fifty pages, in a discussion about how 
most “intellectuals simply took both the priority and primacy of science over 
technology as gospel before 1980,” and most “disavowed it afterward,” we read that 
some, like “Bruno Latour, went so far as to claim there had existed only one 
ontological entity called ‘technoscience’ all along.”66 Mirowski sees this “loss of 
faith” in science as having “everything to do with the economy”—the bending of 
 
58. Steve Fuller, Why Science Studies Has Never Been Critical of Science: Some Recent Lessons on How to 
Be a Helpful Nuisance and a Harmless Radical, 30 PHIL. SOC. SCI. 5, 6 (2000). 
59. Id. at 8. 
60. Id. at 18 (emphasis omitted). 
61. Id. at 23 (as to its diminished sense of human agency, Fuller paradoxically also sees an eerie 
similarity between “totalitarian and actor-network theorists” in their “glorification of the heroic 
practitioner”!). 
62. See MIROWSKI, supra note 34, at 1. 
63. Id. at 3. 
64. Id. at 3–4. 
65. See id. at 351 n.5. 
66. See id. at 54. This echoes Latour’s argument that we have never been modern (“We have 
never been cut off from our past; we have never been different.”), and that the supposed scientific 
revolution never happened. See Crawford, supra note 5, at 259. 
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science and technology to economic ends.67 The ultimate heresy is then attributed 
to Callon—“scientific knowledge does not constitute a public good as defined in 
economic theory”68—and thereafter the “neoliberals had won.”69 Latour, in this 
narrative, adopts the “trademark neoliberal doctrine” that science has always been 
commercial, “an utter travesty of the actual history.”70 If Latour and Callon are not 
card-carrying neoliberals, but rather accidental ones, it is because they turned their 
“attention to microscale studies of laboratory life, ignoring how the laboratory’s 
macroscale relationship to society was being reengineered all around, not to 
mention the changing identities of the paymasters for all those DNA sequencers 
and inscription devices.”71 Fuller echoes this concern, remarking that when 
laboratories become “objects of fascination,” science studies scholars might fail “to 
see how science reflects larger societal forces.”72 
In discerning whether this set of criticisms is fair—indeed, whether Latour 
and Callon are the appropriate targets of a critique of neoliberal privatization of 
science—the accusation that laboratory studies ignore social and economic forces 
is far from compelling. Of course an ethnographic study is neither a grand theory 
nor a broad quantitative analysis. Nevertheless, the chapter on cycles of credit in 
Laboratory Life traces several (actual, not metaphorical) economic forces on the 
scientific community (grants, money, equipment);73 more importantly, the 
laboratory provides “a model on which you can actually do empirical studies about 
the technologies of society and knowledge production.”74 The remaining criticisms 
reveal Mirowski’s position in the debates over the economics of science, which 
Callon has described as a plea for the restoration of the autonomy of an open, 
academic science, in opposition to a “market with clearly defined boundaries.”75 
Callon does not dispute the need for nonprofit research and scientific autonomy 
(from the economic market), but wants to show, using network theory, “the 
possibility of scientific research that is both autonomous and strongly connected 
[with] firms.”76 
 
67. See MIROWSKI, supra note 34, at 54 (quoting BENOÎT GODIN, MEASUREMENT AND 
STATISTICS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: 1920 TO THE PRESENT 287 (2005)). 
68. See id. at 66 (quoting Barry & Slater, supra note 11, at 301 (quoting Callon)). This is an unfair 
criticism because while Callon says that “[s]cientific knowledge does not constitute a public good as 
defined in economic theory,” see Michel Callon, Is Science a Public Good?, 19 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 395, 
407 (1993) (emphasis added), he also states that “[s]cience is a public good, not because of its intrinsic 
properties but because it is a source of diversity and flexibility,” see id. at 395; see also infra note 117 and 
accompanying text. 
69. MIROWSKI, supra note 34, at 66. 
70. Id. at 327. 
71. Id. at 90. Mirowski suggests that while Latour and Woolgar “gleefully resort[ed]” to 
economic metaphors in Laboratory Life, they “essentially ignor[ed] any substantive economic structures.” 
Id. at 360 n.6. 
72. See Fuller, supra note 58, at 27. 
73. See LATOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 7, at 187–233. 
74. See Crawford, supra note 5, at 253. 
75. See Callon, supra note 23, at 279–81. 
76. See id. at 281. Callon highlights “the importance of the role of scientific research performed 
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I will only briefly summarize the intricate details of Callon’s model of 
interactions between laboratories and firms, which is concededly speculative, as is 
Mirowski’s suspicion that these interactions degrade science—both theorists are 
engaged in analytical groundwork (even though they both offer examples to support 
their current assessments and their predictions). My own focus is on some of the 
features of Callon’s model relevant to his implied critique of conventional divisions 
and categories in the economics of science. At the outset, it bears mentioning that 
Callon does not seem to share neoliberal tendencies, as he grants to governments 
“a central role in regulating interaction between firms and laboratories,” but even 
there the categories are blurred, as governmental “intervention contributes to the 
constitution of these relations. In other words, the state must not be seen as an 
external player; it is caught in this process of inventing and consolidating new types 
of practices and relations.”77 Callon likewise acknowledges, as does Mirowski, the 
role of the rules of property rights, and also, reflecting European trends in the public 
understanding of science, the role of “concerned groups and laypeople in the 
discussion on the technical options and sometimes even on the choice of research 
objectives.”78 And as to Mirowski’s criticism (and that of others, like Fuller) that 
Callon is not critical—Callon does indeed say that we have to abandon “the idea of 
critique of the hard economists, which is intended to show them they are 
wrong”79—Callon also claims (in that same passage) a right to contribute his own 
market perspective,80 which model is clearly a critique of numerous conventional 
categories and a normative theory.81 But in keeping with Latour’s distaste for 
denunciation, it is not a critique that is on the same terms (or that grants the same 
categories and distinctions) as the target of the critique.82 
For example, Callon sees the ideal of the autonomy of academic science as an 
institutional frame, born of historical contingency but transformed into the 
theoretical necessity of viewing science as a public good.83 In the terminology of 
network theory, creative and productive forces tend to “overflow[ ]” such frames, 
thus economists of science should construct “new analytical tools . . . to account 
for the proliferation of links and interactions crossing over boundaries, and to 
identify the consequences so that new material and institutional frames can be 
discussed and decided.”84 
Moreover, with respect to the term “decided,” the controversy over 
 
in nonprofit organizations, as a constant source of technological diversification that thwarts the natural 
tendency of markets to render techno-economic trajectories irreversible.” Id. at 280 (citing Callon, supra 
note 68). 
77. Callon, supra note 23, at 307. 
78. See id. at 308. 
79. MIROWSKI, supra note 34, at 66 (quoting Barry & Slater, supra note 11, at 301 (quoting 
Callon)). 
80. See Barry & Slater, supra note 11, at 301. 
81. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
82. See Crawford, supra note 5. 
83. See Callon, supra note 23, at 279. 
84. Id. at 279–80. 
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appropriate property rights regimes and over the appropriate role of university (or 
public nonprofit or government) laboratories is “simultaneously scientific and 
political.”85 Thus a biotech firm, for example, engaged in “knowledge production, 
technological developments, and construction of demand, in close interaction with 
consumers,” provides an empirical case and a “veritable social laborator[y] in which 
new arrangements and devices and original rules of the game are tried and argued.”86 
To establish the need for network theory in the economics of science, Callon 
challenges the notion that the characteristics of a scientific “good” (i.e., knowledge 
or information) is intrinsic to science—such characteristics include the status of a 
scientific “good” as (i) either rival (one must compete to get it, like an embodied 
scientist) or nonrival (codified knowledge that anyone can use, like computer code), 
or (ii) either appropriable (one can own it and easily exclude others, like a microscope) 
or nonappropriable (one cannot easily exclude others, like a trade secret, “because its 
disclosure cannot be easily contained”).87 In terms of the conventional public/
private distinction, “codified knowledge demonstrates a high degree of nonrivalry 
and its appropriation cost is high,” so it is a public good, while “embodied 
knowledge is rival and the cost of appropriation is lower,” so it is a private good.88 
And in terms of the distinction between basic (general, universal) and applied or 
technological research, the former conventionally “takes (by its very nature . . . ) or 
should take (for reasons of efficiency . . . ) the form of codified statements. 
Consequently it is a public good. . . . [And it] must be organized according to the 
rules of academic science . . . [where] disclosure is the norm.”89 Overflow is, in this 
conventional perspective, inefficient and must be contained because it “leads to the 
privatization of basic science.”90 
Callon suggests that “rivalry, appropriability, and generality of knowledge” are 
actually not intrinsic properties of science, but rather that their extent “varies 
according to the structure of the networks in which they are produced.”91 Basic 
science is conventionally presumed to be codified statements accessible without 
regard to context, but because “no research finding (scientific statements) contains 
its own meaning” (which “is given to it extrinsically by the network of laboratories 
and competences within which it circulates”), reproducing knowledge requires a 
laboratory—“basic science [cannot] be reduced to . . . information.”92 A scientific 
theory is not intrinsically universal, but is rather diffused and translated as generality 
is gradually created in a network and its infrastructures.93 Distinguishing between 
 
85. See id. at 280. 
86. See id. at 281. 
87. See id. at 284–85. 
88. See id. at 286. 
89. Id. 
90. See id. 
91. See id. at 287. 
92. See id. at 287–88. “[U]niversality is networked . . . [and] valid only in the rare places that have 
been configured to cater for it.” Id. at 289. It “is an outcome and not a starting point.” Id. at 290. 
93. See id. at 290–92. A scientist producing knowledge must “interest, enroll, and ally with other 
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emergent and consolidated networks (as extremes on a continuum), Callon reverses 
the notion that nonrivalry, nonappropriability, and universality are given (or 
intrinsic to, or characteristic of) a new discovery—emerging scientific knowledge is 
actually “rival, appropriable, and specific” (or local) until it is replicated (at some 
cost) and becomes a consolidated configuration similar to Kuhn’s normal science.94 
Emergent and consolidated (or aligned) networks “are of course ideal types, purified 
forms that do not exist as such in reality. What we observe in the real world are 
hybrid evolving forms.”95 Even the common distinction basic and applied research 
is questioned by Callon, who suggests the term “fundamental research” for 
emergent configurations, because the “capacity to produce basic knowledge” 
depends on participation in consolidated networks, where “basic” and “applied” 
research interacts.96 
A firm engaged in competition will align with laboratories having 
“competences and knowledge that are sufficiently different from its own to allow 
the opening up of new technological options, but sufficiently similar to make 
communication possible at a reasonable cost.”97 This may involve tensions and 
trade-offs between (i) “openness, unexpected events, and new connections” and (ii) 
closed-ness, “known trajectories, and the reinforcement of links.”98 University 
laboratories compete for these alliances to extend their networks, even as they might 
also compete for government grants to support teachers who engage in emergent 
(fundamental) research, publish, and attend conferences to facilitate relationships in 
the field.99 But laboratories may need nonpublic funds, which engenders “a hybrid 
environment, a chain of intermediaries between . . . laboratories and firms.”100 
Alliances between laboratories and firms also presuppose “a sort of hybridization 
of firms, i.e., the integration by those firms of a core group of researchers” creating 
collaborative boundary organizations, perhaps “firm-laboratories.”101 
Returning to the implied debate between Mirowski and Callon, it is difficult 
to extract a normative argument from Callon, paralleling and opposing Mirowski’s 
concerns over the degradation of science, that firm/laboratory interactions produce 
better science, but Callon does argue that his description is more accurate: 
overflowings (from conventional frames) happen, they are likely “irresistible and 
irrevocable,” and laboratory autonomy is not threatened by “connections between 
 
actors.” Id. at 293. “Little by little socio-technical networks emerge from such relationships, through 
progressive learning, iteration, negotiation, and adaptation.” Id. at 294. 
94. See id. at 291–92. 
95. Id. at 297. 
96. See id. at 302. 
97. See id. at 305. 
98. See id. at 306. 
99. See id. at 311. 
100. See id. 
101. See id. at 310–11 (explaining that integration might include giving the firm “access to the 
laboratory’s seminars,” or receiving scientists from public laboratories into the firm’s “own research 
centers”). 
Caudill_production read v3 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 6/28/2015  9:25 PM 
408 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:393 
fundamental research and the economic market.”102 For my purposes, I have 
emphasized how Callon proceeds by challenging the assumptions and categories 
that provide the foundation for Mirowski’s concerns. 
IV. STRUCTURAL EFFECTS OF THE ECONOMY ON SCIENCE IN LAW 
Economists stage a play with double-bound actors: [firms and laboratories] must interact 
but without crossing boundaries! The only relationships that these straitjacketed actors 
are allowed are those that emerge from the circulation of information. The conditions for 
their production are simply ignored. This is simple exchange economics, whereas one of 
the key points of science studies is that the circulation and production of knowledge are 
inseparable: they are one and the same process.103 
The scientific enterprise can be conceived as virtually independent from the 
economy—except in cases of fraud driven by monetary greed, external financial 
support of science does not affect the internal workings of science. It is perhaps an 
advancement in the economics of science for some to argue that financial support 
is an unqualified good, as it fosters efficiency and innovation—they point to “hard-
won” “[a]dvances in medical and surgical care” due to industry collaborations.104 
But others, while conceding the inevitability of funding as well as the “social forces 
and political agendas . . . result[ing] in significant scientific progress,” warn that the 
pressure of commercialization could reduce collaboration among scientists, 
undermine “scientific progress, and contribute to the premature application of 
technologies.”105 The “statistically significant association between industry 
sponsorship and pro-industry conclusions” in one study has raised questions about 
whether we can trust biomedical research findings.106 This too is an advancement, 
to recognize both positive and negative effects of the economy on science. 
Mirowski’s work constitutes yet another advance, by distinguishing between an 
individualistic and a systemic or structural perspective on the potential problems of 
interaction between the economy and science. If the problems are conflicts of 
interest, low methodological quality, or “accept[ing] remuneration geared to the 
outcome of a research project,” on the part of individual scientists, then we 
encourage transparency and disclosure, better methodology, and ethical 
guidelines.107 But those solutions do not begin to address the sort of recent 
structural changes brought about by economic forces on science. 
 
102. See id. at 312–13. Moreover, Callon notes that he has adopted “a point of view that is largely 
normative,” notwithstanding that the “sociology of science . . . proclaims itself agnostic.” Callon, supra 
note 68, at 418. 
103. See Callon, supra note 23, at 287. 
104. See Thomas P. Stossel, Opinion: What’s Wrong with COI?, SCIENTIST ( June 12, 2012), 
http://the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/32190/title/Opinion-What’s-Wrong-with-COI-/. 
105. See Timothy Caulfield, Opinion: Pressured to Commercialize, SCIENTIST (May 28, 2012), 
http://the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/32158/title/Opinion-Pressured-to-Commercialize/. 
106. See Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical 
Research: A Systematic Review, 289 JAMA 454, 454 (2003). 
107. See Sylvia Rowe et al., Funding Food Science and Nutrition Research: Financial Conflicts and Scientific 
Integrity, 89 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 1285, 1288 (2009). On the issue of methodological quality, a 
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Recall Latour’s version of the sociology of scientific knowledge, where the 
phenomena under analysis “have the characteristics of being narrative, collective, 
and outside [of us]. They are quasi objects; they are not of our own making. . . . That 
is it: real, narrated, social.”108 In the discourse concerning financial bias in science, 
many of the solutions offered to counteract the pernicious effects of the economy 
on science seem aimed at ensuring that scientific knowledge is not rhetorical or 
social. Get rid of the bad apples who fabricate data for financial gain, and look past 
or behind the false promises of the bad pharmaceutical company to discern the 
promotion of the “quick and dirty result over the calm and measured finding. . . . 
[Ultimately, getting] those new discoveries out the door and into the world as soon 
as possible.”109 Even Mirowski’s critique of litigation science (research performed 
after a case has been brought), allegedly a structural analysis of the 
commercialization of science,110 is also an avowed critique of science studies. In 
Daubert on remand to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Kozinski expressed 
a preference for science that preexists litigation because research “conducted 
independent of the litigation provides important, objective proof that the research 
comports with the dictates of good science. . . . [Experts relying on] existing research 
are less likely to have been biased toward a particular conclusion by the promise of 
remuneration.”111 That conclusion is questionable, given that existing 
pharmaceutical research is sometimes tainted; and there is no structural reason that 
litigation science is necessarily of a low quality.112 ( Judge Kozinski went on to say 
that law-enforcement forensic science, which is clearly litigation science, does not 
raise the same concern;113 that conclusion is also questionable in light of the recent 
National Academy of Sciences study of forensic science, which raised concerns 
about the independence of laboratories administered by law enforcement agencies 
and recommended public forensic laboratories.114) Yet Mirowski joins in the 
condemnation of litigation science, (i) viewing it as a corporate enterprise (even 
though in cases against pharmaceutical companies, it is the plaintiffs that need 
litigation science), (ii) labeling it just-in-time science and retaining the boundary 
 
perceived problem, most investigations into commercial funding of scientific research have “found no 
association between sponsorship and overall methodological quality.” Sergio Sismondo, Pharmaceutical 
Company Funding and Its Consequences: A Qualitative Systematic Review, 29 CONTEMP. CLINICAL TRIALS 
109, 109 (2008). 
108. See Crawford, supra note 5, at 264. 
109. See MIROWSKI, supra note 34, at 289. 
110. See id. at 288 (“[T]he problem of scientific fraud will not be central to my current inquiry. 
Rather, I want to set out some relatively tractable notions of ‘good science’ . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
111. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations 
omitted). 
112. See Sheldon Krimsky, The Ethical and Legal Foundations of Scientific ‘Conflict of Interest,’ in LAW 
AND ETHICS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: REGULATION, CONFLICT OF INTEREST, AND LIABILITY 
63, 63–81 (Trudo Lemmens & Duff R. Waring eds., 2006). 
113. See Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317 n.5. 
114. See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY., NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH 
FORWARD 183–84 (2009). 
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“between purpose-built science for litigation . . . and academic science in standard 
peer-reviewed journals,” and (iii) blaming science studies for taking a symmetrical 
approach toward assessing critically both litigation science and peer-reviewed 
science: “[t]his is not the first time we observe science studies beginning to make a 
pact with neoliberal conceptions of knowledge, but it is certainly one of the most 
dispiriting.”115 Notwithstanding his starting point, that commercialization alone is 
not a marker of the decline of science,116 Mirowski seems to revert to an earlier 
(Mertonian) sociology of errors in science—only bad science is characterized by 
coproduction. Given that Mirowski’s examples of the structural effects of the 
economy on science in law are quite individualistic (corporate production of 
defense-friendly science, and applying for low-quality patents, although the latter is 
arguably a result of systemic commercial pressures), we might say that it is difficult 
to sustain a systemic or structural analysis of science and the economy while 
maintaining such normative distinctions between academic science and commercial 
pursuits, open and privatized science, and basic and applied science. As an example 
of an analysis of the interaction between science and the economy that does not 
assume such distinctions, we have Callon’s model, which blurs conventional 
boundaries to include hybrids (i) of basic and applied science (in consolidated 
networks), (ii) of academic and commercial pursuits (in boundary configurations 
and hybrid firm/laboratories), and (iii) of public and private domains (e.g., science 
is not intrinsically a public good, but becomes a public good in the network as “a 
source of diversity and flexibility”).117 
CONCLUSION 
[When sociologists of science] try to reconnect scientific objects with their . . . web of 
associations, . . . we always appear to weaken them, not to strengthen their claim to 
reality. . . . [W]e want to add reality to scientific objects, but, inevitably, through a sort 
of tragic bias, we seem always to be subtracting some bit from it.118 
I am beginning to appreciate Latour’s goal of description in advance of 
critique, of groundwork, of trying to understand how given or conventional 
categories and distinctions might eclipse certain features of the interactions between 
law, science, and the economy. It is not simply that we need to acknowledge the 
complexity of that interaction by creating new categories (such as hybrids), or by 
adding more pieces to the analysis,119 but that we need to acknowledge a particular 
 
115. See MIROWSKI, supra note 34, at 304–05. 
116. See Mirowski & Van Horn, supra note 32, at 507–08. 
117. See Callon, supra note 68, at 395, 416 (“[P]ublic and private science are complementary 
despite being distinct: each draws on the other. . . . A firm that funds diversity by supporting new 
collectives is producing a public good and the government agency that contributes to a yet stronger 
linkage between the research it funds and the perfecting of Tomahawk missiles are supporting a science 
that can doubtless be called private.”). 
118. See Latour, supra note 10, at 237. 
119. See Theodore M. Porter, Thin Description: Surface and Depth in Science and Science Studies, 27 
OSIRIS 209, 211 (2012) (“While thick description does tend to get complicated . . . it does not refer 
merely to an abundance of detail.”). 
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kind of complexity that is not visible when conventional boundaries are honored—
we may need to get rid of some assumed pieces (such as inside/outside distinctions) 
and do away with shortcuts (whether that shortcut is assuming commercialization 
always degrades science or always fosters efficiency and innovation). Distinctions 
can remain—science is neither the law nor the economy—but the boundaries are 
blurred when a scientific expert appears in court or a scientific report is delivered 
to a governmental agency, because the acquired science is a coproduction or hybrid 
of legal recognition, scientific practices, and economic structures. Expertise is 
mutually constituted and conditioned by all three enterprises in one domain; and 
because each enterprise is equally rhetorical, social, institutional, political, and 
historical, there is no priority or privileging based on one enterprise escaping from 
culture. Establishing that analytical framework is a descriptive project, and is easily 
criticized for leaving everything as it is—“fine, it is a coproduction, but the scientific 
enterprise, the economy, and the law open for business tomorrow and do not 
change or improve on the basis of a more accurate description.” 
On the other hand, to say that all of the science that is appropriated by law 
(on terms established in law but informed by science) is structured and constituted, 
not merely influenced or supported, by economic forces, is a critique. It is a critique 
of Judge Kozinski’s categorization of litigation science as suspect (and the 
categorization of law enforcement laboratory forensic science as reliable in Daubert 
on remand);120 it is a critique of David Goodstein’s “insider” description (for federal 
judges) of how science works (with social and rhetorical supports that have little 
effect on the results of research);121 it is a critique of Paula Stephan’s mundane 
acknowledgment of the economy “shap[ing] science” with no cause for alarm;122 
and it is a critique of Professors Thomas McGarity and Wendy Wagner, who in 
Bending Science: How Special Interests Corrupt Public Health Research sound the alarm, but 
focus on direct influences on science by bad actors.123 These critiques, however, are 
only constructive if judges and regulators can understand that revealing science as a 
coproduction of social, rhetorical, and natural “forces” is not a critique of the 
scientific enterprise, but an arguable description of our state of affairs. 
Whether law, science, and the economy are one domain, once conventional 
boundaries are erased, remains a question. I return to my epigraph about getting rid 
of all the usual categories “because they divide up a cloth that we want seamless in 
order to study it as we choose”124—it is seamless for a moment, but then new 
categories and boundaries are generated by any critical analysis. Even Callon, in his 
critique of Mirowski for maintaining traditional distinctions, assumptions, and 
categories, immediately introduces new distinctions, assumptions, and categories 
 
120. See MIROWSKI, supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
121. See Goodstein, supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
122. See STEPHAN, supra note 31. 
123. See David S. Caudill, Economics and/of Science: The Meaning(s) of Financial Bias and the Ideal of 
Interest-Free Science in Law, 16 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 247, 264–65 (2013). 
124. See LATOUR, supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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(like “emergent” and “consolidated” configurations). Law and literature can be 
conceived as one domain, but we immediately start to address what type of literature 
law is (not a novel or a poem or a play, but literature or literary nonetheless). In 
breaking down distinctions between law and society, we do not stop identifying 
analytical categories—we simply get rid of some old ones. Law, science, and the 
economy are one, in a sense, but not in the sense that there are no new boundaries 
to replace conventional categories and distinctions. 
 
